

# LIBERATION

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PW



→ DRAWINGS BY JULES FEIFFER

→ FOUR ARTICLES

SIDNEY LENS: CUBA REVISITED

# LIBERATION AN INDEPENDENT MONTHLY

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## In This Issue:

**GORDON S. CHRISTIANSEN** is chairman of the Chemistry Department at Connecticut College and an active member of the New England Committee for Non-Violent Action.

**MANFRED MACARTHUR** is the pseudonym one of America's leading labor economists uses when he writes for LIBERATION.

**ELISE BOULDING** was one of 21 women (12 American and 9 Soviet) who took part in a week-long conference on methods of reducing world tension, held at Bryn Mawr College last month. Her husband Kenneth contributed an

article "Violence and Revolution" to our April 1960 issue.

**JULES FEIFFER** took part in the civil-defense protest in New York last spring. He appears regularly in the Village Voice (Sheridan Square, New York 14, N. Y.)

Readers who want a longer presentation of Editor SIDNEY LENS' second look at the Cuban Revolution will find it in the November 1st issue of Fellowship (Box 271, Nyack, N. Y., 30c).

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## editorials

### A LETTER TO OUR NEIGHBORS

Parents are asking "Why shouldn't we build a shelter as long as there is even the slightest chance of saving ourselves or at least our children?" If mankind were threatened by a natural calamity that could not be controlled and you had no choice but to live and bring up your children in a highly precarious situation, the answer would be obvious: "Of course you should provide such protection as you can for yourself and your dependents." But civil defense claims to protect us from a man-made calamity which, as a matter of fact, is more apt to destroy both us and our children if we seem to have some protection against it.

James Reston, head of the Washington Bureau of the New York Times, said recently: "The situation, to put it mildly, is in a mess." It always has been. Some years ago attempts were made to put forward Evacuation as the way to save a lot of lives. A few exercises were staged under conditions having only a remote resemblance to nuclear-war conditions. The program was so patently absurd that it had to be dropped.

The next phase of civil-defense mobilization emphasized taking shelter. Eleanor Roosevelt, Governor Robert Meyner and Senator Stephen Young, among others, denounced the program as "a cruel deception," and asserted that peace was the only security. A public protest movement grew and most Americans displayed an "I couldn't care less" attitude to the widely publicized national alerts.

Now we have been catapulted into a new situation. The Cold War has been heated up. Nuclear war is no longer an abstraction. It may actually break out. We are repeatedly told that we must have the will to fight as well as the means. President Kennedy, in his November 11th address at the Arlington National Cemetery (on what used to be called Armistice Day in the golden years when people still believed Armistice was the prelude to peace), said: "In the end the only way to maintain the peace is to be prepared to fight for our country and to mean it." (Emphasis added.) So now there is a tremendous step-up in the campaign to per-

suade us to build shelters. But nothing has really changed and there is no reason to take the present civil-defense propaganda any more seriously than before.

There is, in fact, more confusion than ever (if that is possible) about what to do and how to do it. In the late summer a definitive pamphlet was supposed to be ready to tell citizens just what to do. It was to go to every family in the country with a letter from the President himself. But on November 11th the pamphlet was still being written and the idea of having the President risk his standing by sending it with a personal letter had been quietly dropped.

Moreover, when all the gobbledegook about civil defense is analyzed, it becomes plain as day that: *There is no defense for millions upon millions in cities and towns or vast numbers in the country surrounding cities or military centers. They are expendable. We may save a few million in sparsely inhabited areas and some lucky individuals in populous states who accidentally escape the fires that will rage widely, are favored by winds which carry fallout in another direction, and happen to be near a shelter when the blow falls.* This is the "insurance" you are being offered. On this basis you are exhorted to build a shelter in the basement (if you have one), to dig a hole in a sand-bank (if you have property with a sand-bank on it), or to pay taxes to have a shelter built and stocked in a school or community center.

True, there are those who still talk about a limited nuclear war in which only a few cities would be destroyed. But when they "get down to business," they estimate that "only" twenty million people might perish in such a war. But even this assumes that once a war started and bombs were being exploded there would be on both sides enough common sense and restraint to bring about an agreement to call it quits. If in a moment of worse tension this could happen, it obviously can happen without first slaughtering a minimum of twenty million people on each side. No, it is the big war for which the huge arsenals on both

sides are being built and, as President Kennedy has declared, we mean to fight such a war, given the circumstances.

To provide any "shelter system" which might make survival possible, not the survival of a few individuals but of a significant part of the population, would require permanent deep underground shelters to house much of our economy, our communications system, and our living quarters. The cost of building these underground fortresses and moving into them would be, according to a statement by two hundred leading educators from Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Brandeis, and Boston University, the equivalent of our whole present national capital and would consume a substantial part of our gross national product for years.

We are not likely to incur that expense. We are not likely to move as a people into the caves and thus surrender our freedom and scuttle our way of life before any bombs have fallen. Even if we decided to do so, it would be a self-defeating move, for our enemies would take this as positive proof that we were planning war and would not let us carry out such a plan. Having already surrendered morally and politically, we would bring upon ourselves the



holocaust we wanted to avoid. To adopt really big "shelter" plans is to sign an irreversible suicide pact.

So we are back at shelters to save, perhaps, a few, while the majority are being obliterated and while poisons are being let loose which will cause the temporary survivors to die slowly after months or perhaps years, and will subject their children to genetic distortion. In this context, in an effort to make such a war seem after all acceptable, and perhaps in order to soothe a little the uneasy consciences of those who are engaged in preparing for it, you are told that there is "insurance" for you in a shelter program. But the chances that in accepting the very possibility of war you are sentencing your children to death are far greater than that you will help save them while the death sentence you have helped to pass falls upon others.

If you are going to bring this down to the stark level of survival "for me and my wife, my son John and his wife," as the old prayer had it, then at least face certain questions:

"Do I, who can afford a shelter, build one and let others who cannot do without?"

"Do I rush into my shelter with my children, leaving others to perish in anguish outside?"

"Do I carry this so-called logic of self-preservation to the point of shooting my neighbor or his children if they try to enter when I and mine have no space to spare?"

"Since self-preservation is a 'law of nature,' do I break into my neighbor's shelter if I can't reach mine? If not, why not?"

"What kind of society are we now helping to create for our children, what kind of standards are we teaching them, what example are we giving to keep them from abandoning any attempt to be civilized and cultured?"

As leading generals and statesmen, as well as so-called idealists and utopians have said so often, "There is no alternative to peace." Each of us individually and the people as a whole must give themselves to the struggle for peace. This task is so big, so urgent, so demanding, that all our energies and resources must be devoted to it. Nothing must divert us. As Einstein said when he sadly viewed the prospect which had been created by production of the H-bomb, "It is not possible to make

peace and prepare for war at the same time."

If you have come to the point where for whatever reason you despair of peace and feel helpless to do anything to avert war and prevent the world from sinking back into savagery, then to live a normal life while you can, to maintain as happy and rich a life for your children as you can, to uphold standards in your community, to refuse to be stampeded into fear and hysteria, "to walk with head held high," as George F. Kennan phrased it, "while we are permitted to walk this earth at all," is still the best option you have, best for you, your children, your country, mankind.

By such means you will also keep from placing an additional obstacle in the way of those of your fellow citizens who have not despaired and who in growing numbers are resolved to stop the mad nuclear-arms race, to build a decent, free and brotherly world society.

You will avoid lending unwilling support to the reactionaries and proto-Fascists in this country who feed on fear and war hysteria.

You will avoid abetting fly-by-night operators who are exploiting the national crisis to enrich themselves or the big corporations that will make the fat profits out of the vast public-shelter programs that are inevitably coming if you join the stampede.

You will avoid playing into the hands of politicians like Governor Rockefeller who, whatever their other motives, are in effect seeking to advance their political careers by surpassing the administration in calling for more tests, more missiles, more Polaris submarines—and, at the same time, more shelters, shelters which surely become more "necessary" as you pile up the weapons of mass extermination but even more surely worthless as the chances of war are increased.

You will avoid helping to perpetuate the confusion, the duplicity, the irrelevancy and the ineptitude which mark the so-called civil defense program.

*Don't build that shelter. Don't let your representatives and officials use your money for public shelters.*

There are infinitely better uses for your brains, energy, time and money!

Build decent houses for the millions in this country who still live, exist, in horrible slums: save the

children of these slums from living death now, rather than spending money or time on a shelter of dubious worth for your children on some day in the future.

Help build homes for the hundreds of millions of people, who also have children, in other parts of the world, who never have had a decent shelter against cold, heat, wind and rain. By building fallout shelters for ourselves we make it more likely that they will perish without any shelter at all from fallout in a war about which they will have had nothing to say.

Demand that public funds and energy be expended to improve our educational systems, which are all too often in a disgraceful and demoralized state.

Let us not retreat into the caves, but move forward into the light. Let us build homes, schools, hospitals, art galleries, libraries, playgrounds for all men and their children, all over the good earth. Let us build peace.

THE EDITORS


#### A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION?

Since the Soviet government finds it necessary to keep its bomb tests secret from the Russian people, the inference must be that the system behind the Iron Curtain is not so monolithic as the American press likes to make it appear. To make a comparison, the American government had to lie—and apparently continues to lie—about the Cuban adventure, fearing the popular reaction. In both the United States and Russia, champions of the Cold War thrive on the myth that the "other" government controls all thought and feeling, and the people are powerless. Yet evidently there is a third force in existence beside the warring power-groups, namely the peoples who must be cajoled and deceived. It is immensely hopeful that sporadically everywhere, and in increasing numbers, this third force is making itself heard and thereby coming to realize that it exists. As soon as it becomes clear that, with regard to the nuclear war, these separate peoples are one humanity united in refusal, this force will be irresistible. Indeed, it is a question whether, blocked in war-making, the governments will be able to stand at all; that is, whether, in the rising tide of protest, we are not suddenly approaching a revolutionary situation.

P. G.

# FIRST STRIKE, SECOND STRIKE--OUT!

GORDON S. CHRISTIANSEN shows that in the confused state of American deterrence policy any serious move toward a sheltered population becomes virtually an act of war.



THE MORAL PACIFIST, in his conscientious objection to civil defense drills, makes a very simple, uncomplicated public witness which in effect says, "I refuse to cooperate in CD drills because the whole thing is fraudulent and wicked." As a moral witness this is sufficient. But as a reasonable pragmatic argument against the shelter program it has no meaning at all.

When the civil defense director quotes President Kennedy to establish the necessity and efficacy of basement fallout shelters; when the A.P. syndicates Edward Teller's assertion that these shelters would be ninety per cent effective in saving lives; when *Life* magazine asserts that the life-saving factor would be ninety-seven per cent; then we have the militarists' reciprocal of the pacifists' moral witness. The two versions are opposite in content but equivalent in logical basis. Kennedy, Teller and Luce have offered dramatic emotional witness that righteousness—and salvation—are to be found in the corner of a basement, surrounded by an eight-inch wall of concrete blocks. But they have offered no more evidence in substantiation than have the pacifists who stand in the park when the sirens blow.

The drive toward a massive civilian shelter program, which is part of the mobilization plan announced by the President last July, will not accomplish what it claims: it will not protect a high percentage of the population; it will not provide a joyous and full life underground; it will not offer a habitable post-attack environment; it will not defend the values of a free and democratic society; it will not contribute to the deterrence of nuclear war. The current saturation coverage of optimistic CD propaganda is obviously wicked in that it deceives; but its paramount wickedness is

in the purpose of the deception rather than in the deception itself. The profoundly evil quality of the civilian shelter program is that it is blindly provocative—the most openly hostile action that either antagonist could possibly intrude into a situation already loaded with hostility and provocation.

Three publications, currently receiving nation-wide distribution, are typical of the popular case for civilian shelters. The three are quite dissimilar but have a common purpose and use many of the same techniques of the hard sell. They supplement each other perfectly for saturation coverage. The first of these is the fourteen-page spread, plus cover picture, in the September 15th *Life*. By innuendo, implication, use of wide-angle photo distortions, general disregard of facts, and occasional outright lies, it presents "Life in the Shelters" as a jolly experience in togetherness. The *Life* article draws heavily, both for substantiating references and for drawings of shelter interiors, from the second publication, *Family Fallout Shelters*, published and distributed by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This government pamphlet (10 cents from the Superintendent of Documents) is a do-it-yourself manual for the construction and provisioning of family shelters. The third publication, a pseudo scholarly-scientific justification of the content of the other two, is a three-part A.P. release of an interview with Edward Teller by A.P. science writer Alton Blakelee. These articles appeared in virtually every subscribing paper in the nation during the period from September 13th to 16th. The content is a series of fatuous assertions which are often self-contradictory and are never substantiated. The whole piece is a capitalization on Teller's reputation as an expert.

The major distortions of these publications are ac-

complished by implication and by denying or ignoring the unattractive facts of nuclear war. The whole tone is: "Things might be tough, but the application of a little American know-how will solve the problems. Spend a week or two underground (it's cozy in a shelter and it will really be quite fun) then, when CONELRAD passes the word that things in the open are just fine again, come out and resume your life where you left off." Nowhere do any of these publications (or any of the thousands of others aimed at the general public) take cognizance of the hard facts of a concerted nuclear attack or the post-attack conditions. Fallout from a single bomb is the single fact considered. The combined effects of the three major direct factors, blast, fire and radioactivity, are never considered. There is no attention to disruption of the ecological balance which is an inevitable outcome of any general attack; no consideration of long-term contamination of the earth or buildings; no reference to the almost certain disruption of community function; it is never even suggested that any post-attack government is likely to be by the military (if enough personnel and facilities remain to organize it). It is always assumed that food, water, medical aid, radio stations, police, CD wardens, fire apparatus, civil government, etc., will be intact and available for instant use during and after the period of high radioactivity. It is always assumed that help will come to the distressed individual from somewhere "outside." Never asked are the questions, "Where will help come from?" "What could be brought here that is not needed just as badly elsewhere?"

### The Facts of Survival

These are the unpleasant but inescapable questions that must be asked, *and answered*, by anyone seriously and honestly concerned about survival. They have not been aired in public, but anyone willing to search out the facts can provide highly probable answers. I have done an analysis for the area in which I live (Southeastern Connecticut). The conclusions are that a person in that area would receive a lethal dose of radiation in less than two minutes if he had no protection at all. If he stayed *constantly* in the best fallout shelter that O.C.D.M. and *Life* advertise he would receive 75 to 80 roentgens during the first six months. If he stayed buried constantly for the first two weeks and then allowed himself two hours a week outside the shelter (hardly excessive time to forage for the necessities of life for a family) he would receive another 160 roentgens. The total of almost 250 roentgens, spread over six months, would make him mildly ill from radiation injury. A person could avoid death by radiation on such a schedule but he would almost surely die of starvation or disease; if he increased his time

out of the shelter in attempts to provide food, water, sanitation facilities and medical aid, then he would be in grave danger of death from radiation.

During the fifth year after the attack, the average level of radiation on the ground surface would be decreasing very slowly from an intensity of about 0.1 roentgen per hour, enough to provide more than 800 roentgens in a year. A dose of this size, if received quickly, would be fatal; spread out over time, it would take two or three years to kill all the people exposed to it. In the report of the White House conference on civil defense, John McCone, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, touched on the problem of long-term contamination which, in his words, "unless removed will contaminate the land and its crops for decades." He offers two possible solutions: first, removal of all the surface soil, which he rightly recognizes requires a great deal of time, equipment and labor and still leaves the problem of what to do with the contaminated topsoil. His second suggestion was "intensive cropping," but he didn't really like this either: "But here again considerable time is required—about 40 crops (that's 40 years in New England) to remove the strontium 90 to acceptable levels."

These are the facts of survival which are obscured, distorted and denied by the popularizers of the civilian shelter program; they are the basis for my accusation of fraudulence in their claims. Confirmation of these views has been provided by Congressman Chet Holifield's Military Operations subcommittee. In an eighty-one-page critique of the Civil Defense program, reported by the *New York Times* on September 21st, the subcommittee stated, "Private, individual shelters are impractical for most Americans."

The facts and conclusions are available to anyone interested enough to search them out and organize them. Why then can responsible governmental officials and agencies, world-renowned scientists, and major elements of our mass media be so diametrically wrong in their assertions? A complete answer to this question would require an analysis in depth of Twentieth Century America and its institutions, relationships and *mores*. In this article I can only attempt to come at the *immediate cause* of this profound aberration.

The source of the disease lies in the theory of deterrence which is currently dominating our international policy; more accurately, it lies in the existence (bordering on serious schizophrenia) of conflicting views of just what variant of deterrence we should be following. The protagonists of the conflicting views are so vocal, powerful and insistent, that none can prevail; the result is that we are attempting to pursue at the same time several incompatible policies which are destroying each other.

So far, the Air Force's theory of "Counterforce" has taken the lion's share of funds, publicity and official backing. Counterforce, the current euphemism for a concept that has travelled under various other names, such as "preventive war," "pre-emptive strike," and "first-strike capability," has the faint moral recommendation of being aimed at enemy weapons rather than populations, but has the more serious moral taint of depending on being the first to start a nuclear war. The heart of the physical basis of this system is the Strategic Air Command bomber force and the heavy-payload missiles such as Atlases and Titans in the United States and Jupiters abroad. It doesn't really matter that these are on "soft" bases because they are intended as first-strike weapons; in fact, to harden them too much confuses the issue by converting them to possible second-strike capability.

The major alternative, the only clearly *alternate* policy, is the "second-strike capability," also called "retaliatory-strike" system (no longer *massive*), or the "finite" or even "limited" deterrent. This system has the serious taint of being aimed at cities full of people, but is partially cleansed by opting for *not* being the one to start a nuclear war. It is backed primarily by the Navy but is also supported by the Army, largely in an attempt to avoid complete domination by the Air Force. The basic weapon of this type of deterrence is the small payload and inherently inaccurate Polaris. Its prime characteristic is the necessity of virtual invulnerability. It becomes useless for second strike if it is discovered; it also changes its character if the weapons become too powerful, too accurate, or too numerous. Hence the deletion of Foster Dulles' favorite adjective, and the substitution for it of the terms "finite" (used by protagonists) and "limited" (used invidiously by the counterforce people). If it becomes an "infinite" deterrent system by increasing numbers, accuracy or explosive force, it then changes from a second-strike capability to a first strike. The basis of the distinction is that the second-strike weapon, to be pure, must be weak enough so that it cannot knock out the enemy's counterforce weapons. It is still adequate for the anti-population work of retaliation because it really doesn't matter whether a megaton lands downtown or uptown (Manhattan or Moscow); furthermore, a few small-megaton-range weapons scattered around a large city are much more effective than a single very large one placed precisely.

The difficulty in all this neat planning is that each side in the argument feels compelled to hedge the bets. The Air Force has taken to hardening its missile sites (even the big ones) and keeping a part of its SAC force in the air constantly. Similarly, the Navy is struggling hard to increase the numbers (it has asked for seven

hundred and twenty operational Polaris missiles; so far it only has authorization for half of these), to improve the accuracy, and increase the size of the warhead. Each of these moves makes the system more usable against enemy hardened missile sites and therefore tends to convert it to a first-strike system. This unresolved conflict within the Defense Department over deterrent strategy, as well as the moves toward apparent double-duty weapon systems has been, not resolved, but institutionalized as a pseudo-policy. It is called the "mixed-deterrent" policy and the continuing argument now takes the form of a discussion of the proportions of the "mix."

But the whole mixed-deterrent argument loses sight of the fact that deterrence depends on the state of mind of the person being deterred. It is simply not possible at the same time to convince an antagonist that a) you really don't want to fight but will hit back if attacked, and b) he had better stop doing what he is doing or you will smack him. The mere assertion of the one threat destroys the credibility of the other. There has been a good deal of lip service given to the notion of credibility; Herman Kahn even includes it in his terminology of the counterforce system, which he calls a "Credible First Strike Capability." In the minds of Kahn, Tom Schelling and the other intellectual mid-



wives of deterrent strategy there is not the slightest question about the necessity of credibility in an effective deterrent nor in the way in which it is achieved. But the primary way in which credibility is created, the way we make the enemy believe implicitly that we will in fact use nuclear weapons if provoked (first strike) or if attacked (second strike), is to believe it absolutely and without question ourselves.

The clarity and certainty of the intellectual advisers, stated repeatedly in numerous short articles and explained at length in such major opera as *On Thermonuclear War* and *Strategy of Conflict*, must certainly have been communicated to the operational administrators of the deterrent policy. Nevertheless, this nation has been in the anomalous position for several years of speaking and acting as if we had a deterrent when in fact a major element has been lacking. Through the

Dulles years we apparently depended on second-strike retaliation ("massive" in his words, but he was probably just being poetic), when actually our weaponry was designed strictly for first-strike counterforce—it was all soft, powerful and allegedly accurate. We are just now building up the weaponry suitable for a second-strike, anti-population policy. About a year ago we started the airborne alert of the SAC bombers; less than a year ago we had the first operational Polaris; the Minuteman was first tested last February.

### The Conditions of Credibility

During the Dulles years (and since then as well) we have talked, and on occasion *acted*, as if we depended on a first-strike capability. We built the weapons of counterforce; we went to great lengths to locate the targets of counterforce (U-2 and Samos overflights to locate Soviet missile sights); we repeatedly threatened first-strike (admittedly with some subtlety and uncertainty, and with fairly constant public moralizing that we would never stoop so low as to *start* a nuclear war); and we neglected alternatives. Yet with all this we failed to provide the crucial element of credibility. Any threat of counterforce (a threat to start a nuclear war) is completely hollow, regardless of how loudly it is made, unless the initiator is prepared to accept the retaliatory blow. So long as the people of America are unprotected, and *know that they are unprotected*, any threat to strike first is simply not believable. Herman Kahn bluntly states the conditions of credibility:

The best that any Credible First Strike Capability can do is make it rational for the United States to go to war as an alternative to tolerating extreme provocations. . . . It should be *credible* that we will go to war if the President and the enemy both see plainly that going to war is rational. One can almost hear the President saying to his advisors, "How can I go to war—almost all American cities will be destroyed?" And the answer ought to be, in essence, "That's not entirely fatal; we've built some spares." (*On Thermonuclear War*, pp. 641-2)

This is the point where the current drive toward a civilian shelter program comes in. Herman Kahn is not talking about basement rooms or fire doors on subways. He is talking about spare cities underground. But it was largely on his advice that Chet Holifield finally came around and supported the three hundred million dollar crash program for civilian shelters, the cheap substitute for Kahn's real program.

To make usable the weapons we now have, we *must* acquire the credibility which comes from a protected civilian population; but we clearly cannot spare the time for the creation of Kahn's "spare cities." We cannot continue to pursue our policy based on counterforce deterrence with one of its major foundations lacking

while we wait for a ten-year program to come to fruition. The only alternative is to *convince* the people that they are protected even when they are not. This is the program launched last July and pursued so vigorously since then; it is the public relations man's attempt to establish cheap credibility for our counterforce deterrent.

Here another level of deception enters the program. It is being pushed hard on the patriotic basis that it will contribute to deterrence, or the prevention of war. It is conceivable that a contribution to *second-strike* capability (which hopefully deters the enemy's first strike) could logically be urged on that grounds, but civil defense constitutes, strategically, an increment to our ability to make a *first strike*, and this cannot be construed sensibly as a war-preventative measure. To urge fallout shelters on this basis is fraudulence compounded by duplicity.

A retaliatory second strike would be used (commitment to its use is a necessary element of credibility as a deterrent) whether or not our population survived the enemy's first strike. The only requirement is that our second-strike *weapons* survive. In this sense this deterrent is actually weakened by diverting funds and effort from the protection of anti-population weapons to the protection of people.

The appearance of our deterrent policy is no longer massive retaliation; we are rapidly shifting, whether by intention or through confusion, to a policy of massive first strike. The United States now has something more than sixty thousand megatons of nuclear bombs and warheads, over twenty-five hundred nuclear-bomb-carrying planes, and about two hundred missiles; within two years we will have a thousand more missiles, and the Navy is pushing hard to add to this a total of seven hundred and fifty Polaris missiles. This whole array is now being committed to first-strike capability by creating the belief of protection in our own minds and thereby credibility in the minds of the enemy. We have established a confused policy of mixed deterrence which tends to respond to all provocations with muffled threats of massive nuclear war. We are in effect lighting the fuse by introducing the last element which will make it work. In the confused state of our deterrence policy any serious move toward a sheltered population becomes virtually an act of war.

World War I was precipitated by the act of mobilization—a seemingly responsible defensive preparation that, once started, could not be stopped short of dragging the world into an unwanted conflict. Half a century later, the apparently sensible defensive action of building population shelters is closely analogous. It could very likely be the wicked move which drags the world over the brink.

# Civil Defense and the Garrison State

MANFRED MACARTHUR



A NEW LINE of business is booming. "Men of stature in the community" are promised a brilliant career. In newspaper ads and over the radio they can read and hear announcements like the following: "The (Joe Doe) exclusive dealership offers a sound and profitable business in the long-range, high potential shelter market." And the claims of the Joe Doe Fallout Shelter Corporation are no empty promises. A business which can count among its salesmen the President of the United States, though not sound, is bound to be profitable.

About the effects of President Kennedy's salesmanship *Time* magazine reports as follows: "The day after the President spoke, civil defense offices across the country were flooded with demands for shelter information. The Denver home builder Jack Woerner quickly sold three new houses containing built-in shelters. A Virginia realtor put ads in Washington papers plugging life and peace of mind outside the Washington target area! . . . In Chicago the Wonder Buildings Corporation which manufactures fabricated shelters, normally sells about 400 a month, last week took orders for 137 in two days." (*Time*, August 4th)

The sales talk of the President is not the only tool in the shelter dealer's sales kit. The government helps also in other ways with the sales promotion. There is for example the tax reduction. Already enterprising builders suggest: add a new recreation room, tax exempt, by observing minimum shelter requirements. As any salesman knows such a promise is irresistible. Any redblooded American will gladly ride to hell provided the cost of the ride can be written off as business expense on the income tax return.

Backed up by such government sales promotion, thousands of "men of stature" currently operate as dealers in the "high-potential" shelter market. This is an ideal field for the small fly-by-night operator who wants to make a fast buck by manufacturing a sub-standard product. Most of the purchasers are unable to judge the quality of the product and they will find out that it is substandard only when it is too late. There won't be any claims or damage suits, because when the product proves itself faulty there won't be anybody

to sue, there won't be any judges and there won't be any witnesses.






The Better Business Bureau has warned that sharp operators are moving into the field of fallout shelter production and that the sale of shelters provides a practically perfect opportunity "for an all time high fleecing of consumers across the country." "Improve fallout shelters!" will become a battle cry rallying liberals of all shades of opinion. This is a chance to protect the common man, promote business and support the defense effort, a combination of causes no liberal of whatever shade can possibly resist.

The effect of such a movement will be legislation across the country similar to that recently adopted in New York State. Governor Rockefeller's program calls for a law which would force the sellers and producers of fallout shelters to meet specified state standards.

Legislation of this type would have one immediate result: it would improve tremendously the job opportunities of all civil servants who are in any way connected with the state enforcement agencies. The above quoted *Time* article reports that Leo Hoegh, former civil-defense director under President Eisenhower, is now vice-president of Chicago's Wonder Building Corporation, the shelter manufacturer already mentioned. At the moment this may be an isolated case, but as Rockefeller's proposal and similar bills become law this will become much more widespread. Just as in the good old days of Office of Price Administration, every little clerk in the various state enforcement agencies will have the choice of several plush jobs in private industry and the civil servants in upper echelons of these agencies will be offered salaries by the private companies they are supposed to police far beyond any the government is able to pay.

This is bound to happen, since the amounts a large shelter producer will be able to save by influencing the government employees who determine the standards and approve his product are bound to be many times as large as the salaries he has to pay to these contact men. Consequently we will eventually have the same development in the civil-defense field as in the military field, where hundreds of former generals and admirals

# JULES



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# F E I F E R

I USED TO  
BE VERY  
ATHLETIC -  
A MODEL  
OF  
AMERICAN  
YOUTH!



BUT OUTSIDE OF BUMPING INTO THINGS AND NEVER QUITE KNOWING WHAT WAS GOING ON I WAS STILL IN FAIRLY GOOD SHAPE. AND THEN CAME THE BERLIN CRISIS. MY BACK GAVE OUT. MY STOMACH TURNED SOUR. AND I DEVELOPED MIGRAINE.



THEN I HEARD SOMEWHERE THAT CRITICS WERE ATTACKING AMERICAN YOUTH FOR BEING OUT OF SHAPE -




I CAN'T SEE - I CAN'T HEAR - I CAN'T BREATHE - I CAN'T STAND - AND I DON'T WANT ANYTHING MORE THAN TO GO INTO A FALLOUT SHELTER AND VANISH -




WHAT DO THEY MEAN OUT OF SHAPE? I LOOK UPON MYSELF AS THE MAN OF THE FUTURE.

BUT THEN CAME THE CONGO CRISIS WHEN IT SEEMED THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE. MY EYES STARTED BOthering ME AND I HAD TO GIVE UP READING THE PAPERS AND GET GLASSES.



BUT EXCEPT FOR MY EYES I WAS STILL IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE - AND THEN CAME THE LAOTIAN CRISIS. IT SEEMED THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE. MY HEARING STARTED BOthering ME AND I HAD TO GIVE UP LISTENING TO RADIO NEWS AND GET A HEARING AID.



are on the public-relations staffs of the large armament manufacturers. The small firms will be weeded out, a few of the more blatant little cheats will be sacrificed and the industry will be firmly in the grip of the large producers.

There are other factors which will speed up such a development. Until now we have looked only at the private-shelter market, but in a few years this will be only a minor sideline in the civil-defense picture. The big money will be made in the construction of public shelters. Kennedy achieved a minor breakthrough in this respect a few months ago. Until then appropriations for civil defense had been cut by Congress regularly by fifty to seventy-five per cent. Since civil defense supposedly had as its purpose the protection of the lives of mere civilians, the average congressman naturally felt that it was aimed at pampering the people, another step toward Bolshvism. In vain, experts tried to explain that creating an "early shelter capability" was part of creating a "first strike capability," and that as such shelters were as much an offensive weapon as Polaris missiles. The average congressman just hadn't the "capability" of grasping this argument.

It took the inventiveness of the New Frontiersmen to change this situation. By the simple device of transferring control to the Defense Department, they got the civil-defense budget approved without any cut. By far the largest part of this budget is earmarked for an inventory of basements in public buildings which could be used as fallout shelters. However, part of the research funds will be used to complete the study and analysis of a public fallout shelter, the development of which seems to be quite far advanced. According to testimony developed in congressional hearings, each of these shelter buildings is designed for a hundred-person occupancy and the cost (including profit) of a prototype (including 14-day rations) amounted to more than twenty-five thousand dollars per building or more than two hundred and fifty dollars per person. At this rate, the cost of fallout shelters for two hundred million people would amount to fifty billion dollars.

The witness who testified on this program expected that in mass production the costs could be reduced to sixty dollars per person, or twelve billion dollars for the total population. This may be professional optimism nurtured by the desire to make such a program palatable to the congressional audience. Nevertheless, it is interesting for at least two reasons: In the first place, whether costs will eventually be reduced by half, two-thirds, or three quarters, such savings are possible only through mass-production techniques which are available only to a few giant corporations which can spend millions of dollars for tooling-up purposes. Conventional builders with a capacity of producing a few hundred

private shelters per month can't even be considered. In the second place these figures suggest the huge profits that will be made by these giant corporations through concealed cost savings if the total program amounts to twenty to fifty billion dollars, and if potential cost reductions amount to fifty to seventy-five per cent.

At the moment it would be hard to sell such a program, but two years from now the resistance is bound to be weaker. By that time, we will be moving into the next recession and the brave New Frontiersmen will look frantically for a way out. A large-scale civil-defense program will appear as the ideal solution. Keynes once facetiously suggested that a faltering economy could be pump-primed by digging holes in the ground. The American example might prove that in an insane society digging holes can become the most effective full-employment measure. The American disciples of Keynes who are unable to push through any socially useful program of public works might get a chance to bolster a sagging economy through a large-scale public-shelter program simply because such a program, although almost useless, has the blessing of the military authorities.

The use of large-scale military-construction projects as a pump-priming device has a long history. It was done the first time, very successfully, by Adolf Hitler, or rather Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's top economic adviser. It is today conveniently forgotten that Schacht used all the tools of Keynesian economic policy long before Keynes published his theory. Schacht performed the "miracle" of German economic recovery largely through the deficit financing of the Autobahn construction of the network of military highways.

In present-day America a large-scale fallout shelter program could perform the same function that the military-highway construction performed in Nazi Germany. In fact, large-scale construction projects are the only programs in which military spending can be used efficiently as a pump-priming device. Military expenditures on missiles and other modern weapon systems are used to a large extent for research and development and are paid to white collar workers where unemployment is relatively low. A large-scale shelter program on the other hand can utilize more efficiently the large reserves of unemployed unskilled or semi-skilled labor. This is the reason why one or two years from now, in the course of the next recession, a public fallout shelter program for the total population might become irresistibly attractive.

A public fallout shelter program for the total population is only the first step in the military scheme of things to come. Fallout shelters just below the surface don't give any protection against the direct impact of the bomb. In the civil-defense hearings a witness tes-

tified that a five-megaton bomb dropped in the center of a city of the size of Indianapolis would have a sufficient blast effect to destroy all shelters within the city area. The witness added hopefully that because of the irreducible aiming error the bomb would in all probability miss the center and that consequently the shelters on one or the other periphery will be of some use. Actually this testimony is over-optimistic, because the fire storms caused by the bomb blast cover a much wider area. This means that the people at the periphery who are not killed by the direct blast will suffocate in their shelters because of the fire storms. It seems that only in rural areas which happen to be far away from any military target will fallout shelters be of any use by providing protection against radiation. The great majority of the American people who live either in metropolitan areas or in rural areas close to military targets would perish in the shelters either through the direct impact of the bomb or because of the firestorms.

This is why the military planners consider a public fallout shelter program only as a first step. In the gigantic game of "chicken" they are engaged in, civil defense becomes the most offensive weapon. In order to insure a "credible first strike posture," a substantial part of the civilian population has to be adequately protected. Otherwise the enemy won't believe our threats and won't back down. But civil defense has an even more offensive function. Herman Kahn, the high priest of the military planners, found in a private poll that American decision makers would be hesitant to throw the bomb, even under extreme provocation, if they were not convinced that there is a good chance that at least half the American people would survive the retaliatory blow. Consequently, civil defense efforts have to be strengthened in order to remove such hesitancy.

The outlines of what is in store for us can be seen from a memorandum edited by Kahn and published by the RAND Corporation,\* RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-2206-RC. "Some specific suggestions for achieving early non-military defense capabilities and initiating long-range programs" ought to be distributed to every American citizen. It spells out what our current rulers plan for us much more clearly than any Presidential address or press conference.

The most revealing part of the memo is the one dealing with the "initiating of long range programs." There we find, for example, the following recommendations: "Take an inventory of all available mine space. Initiate studies to encourage mining operation. Study ways of encouraging the creation of suitable mine space. Radical changes will be needed. For example we might wish to encourage very deep mining under urban areas.

Improve usage of crushed rock and similar products by improving markets and technology.

"Start the preliminary design for underground installations of ten to twenty factories. Such design ought to exploit the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of underground location. Estimate additional capital costs and additional operating costs of plants located in mines or other underground sites. Draw up lists of strategic materials, sub-assemblies and parts which are to be stockpiled in underground shelters..."

The direction in which this long range program plans to push us is clear. Eventually a large part of American society is to be moved deep underground. We are to sleep in deep underground shelters and work in underground factories. And as the enemy bombs get bigger and bigger we will be digging in deeper and deeper.

There is one aspect of this brave new world which the planners were careful not to subject to analysis. If large parts of our industry are to be located underground this has to be done in accordance with a rigid plan. Even if the "creation of additional mine space" is encouraged, mine space and any other deep underground space will be extremely scarce. It is obviously impossible to leave the distribution of this scarce space to private initiative. What would happen to our First Strike Posture if so large a space were taken up by chewing gum and ice cream factories that not enough room were left for the plants engaged in missile production?


Not only underground space will be scarce. If large parts of industry are located underground, this will require additional transportation, additional power, additional fixed capital expenditures. There will be a shortage of manpower and of material resources throughout the economy. Under these conditions resource allocation cannot be left to the market forces. The economy will be able to function only under the control of a central planning board, which will have to determine priorities and decide on resource allocations. A power elite consisting of the top echelons of the military and business bureaucracy will run the economy, the military establishment and the civilian government.

Two identical societies, each controlled by a power elite, each consisting of subhuman beings who spend most of their lives underground and pursuing as their sole goal the production of ever deadlier weapons for mutual destruction—that is the kind of world which is in store for us, provided we are not blown up before reaching that stage. That is the type of world in which we and our children will have to live in the not distant future if those who are aware of where we are going are unable to reverse the present trend.

\*Available in any large library.

# What Can We Do For Our Children?

Elise Boulding



SINCE I DETECT some tendency on the part of pacifist parents to become hysterical about nuclear hysteria, I should like to address myself to the question of what are realistic, "healthy" and wise activities and attitudes for parents and children in the face of mounting pressure for civil-defense measures.

In the first place I should like to point out the obvious fact that there is a perfectly realistic basis for that fear of nuclear war which drives many families to plan for shelters. Furthermore, parents who permit a sense of impending doom to mount in the household and do nothing whatever to dissipate it are headed for disaster, and so are their children.

Depending on pre-existing personality traits, prolonged unrelieved tension erupts into either frenzied and senseless activity or complete passivity and withdrawal. In either case, the individual is well beyond the point of any rational response to his environment. The Disaster Study Series published by the National Academy of Sciences National Research Council (recommended reading for all concerned laymen) speaks of the counter-disaster syndrome, which may attack even doctors in crisis situations, so that they may apply completely inappropriate treatment to injured persons.\* Stress studies have pointed up again and again that people under severe stress become incapable of drawing on their own problem-solving resources; so much energy is expended in dealing with pent-up emotion that not enough is left for intellectual analysis and decision. In situations of stress the well-integrated person will wisely seek out positive acts which give him some feeling of coping with the situation, even though inadequately. If he remains immobilized through his inability to hit on the absolutely most effective act, the tension will mount to the point where he no longer has effective control over his own problem-solving behavior.

\*Emergency Medical Care in Disasters, Disaster Study No. 6.

In deciding what attitude to take towards those families which build shelters (and for many of us this is now a very immediate neighborhood problem) we should bear in mind George Fox's advice when William Penn, having joined with the Quakers, asked if he should continue to wear his sword. The reply was: "Wear thy sword as long as thou canst." I would interpret that broadly, as meaning that every individual should use the equipment at hand in facing his special life-situation, *not laying it aside until he has found better equipment*. So I would say to my neighbor, "Build thy shelter as long as thou canst," being concerned at the same time to broaden his understanding, in whatever way was available, of the real nature of the threat he faces. If we simply pound the uselessness of shelters into his head without expanding his perception of the real world he is trying to cope with, we leave him and his children helpless and prey to hysteria.

Lest anyone think I am trying to minimize the evils of shelter-building as a solution to the danger of nuclear destruction, let me point out the new stresses which families face once they have seriously committed themselves to the shelter principle. They face the conflicting pulls of the entire Judaeo-Christian value system on which Western society rests, on the one hand, and the most primitive survival impulses of the cornered male animal fighting to preserve his mate and cubs on the other. This conflict is already raging on our street, in a peaceful Midwestern town thirty miles from a "primary target." Our neighbor, who is just now completing a fairly elaborate and extra-solid shelter, has let it be known that he is armed and that the rest of us had better arm also. "When the bomb falls, there'll be thousands of crazy lunatics from \_\_\_\_\_ swarming over us. We have got to be able to defend ourselves. And don't plan on coming to our shelter when the time comes. It will be tightly closed. Build your own." You have all read stories like this in the newspaper, but it

really hits home when it happens on your own street, and you begin to see expressions of mistrust appearing on your neighbors' faces.

The Pentagon and the Office of Emergency Planning are aware of this kind of threat to society, which they realize can be as deadly as nuclear destruction itself. On the other hand, they are also subjected to tremendous pressures to "do something." Hence, in spite of their own better judgement, O.E.P. will be sending a letter to every person on the mailing list of the Department of Internal Revenue this fall, asking him to start planning to build a family shelter. Meanwhile the behavioral scientists in the planning office are hard at work on the group-shelter concept, and if they dared would forbid individual family shelter-building. Here is the Herman Kahn approach translated directly into shelter-planning: "It should be obvious that we are talking about a major planned and directed effort aimed at societal survival, not simply the physical survival of people and resources. The achievement of these goals greatly transcends mere physical and biological survival and the *laissez-faire* assumption that we will permit people to make their own preparations and solve their own problems in the aftermath of disaster." Again, ". . . considering the situation from quite a sophisticated point of view . . . (I propose) being Machiavellian for a few minutes, and suggesting that we think not about helping people by providing shelters during this extreme situation but rather that we think in terms of sheltering people so that we can use them a little later in the recovery and reestablishment of the social fabric."\* I cannot leave this macabre subject without pointing out that this remarkable approach to the problem of saving a free democratic society from the evils of Marxist totalitarianism is *not* representative of the general tenor of thought among social scientists today.

Do I seem to be getting far from the subject of children? But I am thinking of the children with every word I write. The child caught in his parent's fear of every neighbor and haunted by the picture of his father's gun pointed next door; the child trapped in a large impersonal group shelter, where he is handled as so much protoplasm for rebuilding the state; or the child imprisoned in nameless fears of the unknown, with no defenses of any kind against the shadowy destruction that assumes ever-new shapes in his tortured mind.

*What can we do for our children?* Channel the very realistic fears and tensions which we—and they—feel, into the most relevant acts we can think of (while we can still think rationally), even though we know that

*these acts are not completely adequate.* The main value of these tension-reducing acts may lie in the fact that they are symbolic of the all-important fact that we haven't given up, that we are still busy thinking and working, intending to move towards ever more effective acts as the way opens. The number of families who have participated in prayer vigils and peace walks testifies to the value of these symbolic acts for children and parents both. And I would not treat them as tension-reducers only. They are positive acts of communication and identification which in time will exceed in strength the destructive forces that keep erupting in the gaps. Parents have a right to feel, and children have a right to know, that they are free and responsible members of a world society which depends on their actions for its growth and development.

It is also important to help children take a matter-of-fact attitude towards families and friends who are building shelters, and towards any school or community-sponsored shelter programs which the child may willy-nilly be exposed to. The child should understand that while these programs are hopelessly inadequate, they do represent good intentions on the part of the planners, and that the child's main energies should go into participating with his family in their particular peace-oriented efforts rather than into criticizing neighbors and community officials.

I suggest going beyond this matter-of-fact attitude towards the preparations of others, and giving the child some even more matter-of-fact instructions as to what he and the family would do in case of nuclear detonation. If he is old enough to understand the situation at all, he is old enough to understand that there might indeed be a detonation, whether intentional or unintentional, and to need some mental plan of action for it. In case of nuclear war, we are not against surviving, if we are in a situation where survival is possible. We are only against expending all our energy on survival instead of on altering the conditions that would lead to destruction in the first place. Discussion of using the cellar or a well-protected part of the house for temporary shelter from radioactive fall-out is no more damaging for the child than were preparations for shelter-taking in London during the last war. Here all the evidence was that the child could face real danger without trauma as long as he had a parent with him and it was possible to take some realistic measures for protection. The only real trauma in the experiences of these English children appeared when they were separated from their parents and sent to the country for "protection." The anxiety aroused by such separation, which induced nameless fears, was much greater than the anxiety induced by perfectly tangible dangers which could be met at a physical level.

\*Symposium on Human Problems in the Utilization of Fall-out Shelters, Disaster Study No. 12.

All of which points up again the value of the tangible for the child. Tangible identifications, practical acts, are of incalculable value. The fact that several of our own children walked with the Peace Walkers when they were in the Middle West, and have ever since been reading their letters, wearing their buttons, and sending them parts of their allowances, has given them a real sense of participation in a demonstration to the world of a deep conviction about disarmament. Standing in vigils has strengthened this sense of participation. Working for United Nation Children's Fund and being active in Sunday School and clubs on behalf of community needs, help to build in the mind of the child an image of a world worth working for. If all we can see is a mushroom cloud, that is all he will see. If we have an image of a good and possible future, so will he.

One last thing. Those of us who refuse to put our energies into burrowing underground are apt to think of ourselves as lone wolves and figuratively to gather our children 'round us as if we were the last outpost of human reason. One important finding of disaster research is that an isolated family depending entirely on its own resources is more likely to panic and engage in unwise actions than a family in a group setting where individual extremes are modified by the common-sense of wiser heads so that the final course of action is a blend of different reactions. It is important both for us and for our children that we have a meaningful relationship with a group of like-minded people in our community, both to strengthen our courage and capacity for intelligent action, and to discipline what may at times be an over-active imagination.

## any defense?

RADIO-CONTROLLED DRUGS ARE FOUND TO ALTER MOOD  
by Robert K. Plum

DENVER, Nov. 27—Through the use of radio-controlled pellets of medication implanted in the human body, medical science has achieved a degree of technological control of behavior, the American Medical Association's annual clinical meeting was told here today.

However, it remains to be decided how far science should go in meddling with personality, according to Dr. Otto Schmitt, head of the Department of Biophysics of the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis.

Dr. Schmitt urged that the ability to control personality achieved in recent technical developments be studied in the way that the problems posed by nuclear weapons are studied. That is, physicians should further perfect the ability to control personality or behavior and at the same time learn how to use the control ability well. . . .

"We can make a man rough and aggressive or we can calm him down. Now we must study how we can use this ability for the good—to make a man better able to do his job."

Dr. Schmitt said that much of the present work on technological control of behaviour was being done by the military and that most of the achievements were classified as secrets.

Both biochemical and electrical means can be used to modify personality behavior, the Minnesota biophysicist reported.

The electrical method would introduce signals into the nervous system—at command from a controlling station—to stimulate or depress particular types of behaviour.

The chemical method would use implanted pellets controlled by radio. They might contain hormones or other chemicals. A pilot, for example, might have his mood regulated by the external control station. In other situations such a method of personality control could be used to attract the attention or to call for special efforts by the operator on the piece of military equipment. . . .

The entire science of pattern recognition, Dr. Schmitt said, is receiving tremendous military emphasis at present.

New York Times, November 28th

# CUBA REVISITED

Sidney Lens

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION is entering a third, uncharted phase. The first phase was the struggle for power in which the middle class and the peasants united behind Castro against Batista and his American allies. The second was the rupture between these two classes resulting from a speed-up of revolutionary change. In this phase, Castro jettisoned the political democracy promised to the middle class but initiated a program of economic and social reform that was highly attractive to the eighty percent of the population that is worker and peasant. Now, harassed by invasion, embargoes and a startling changeover in trade and economy, the basic humanism of the Revolution confronts bureaucratic and dogmatic challenges.

Cuba has become part of the Soviet bloc, undergoing a major transition in economy and ideology. For those whose values pivot around the Cold War, this circumstance closes the book on Cuba. It is now a Communist country, therefore a totalitarian dictatorship, and an enemy of freedom, progress and the United States. Such simplistic estimates, however, give us few insights into the dynamic of Cuba, its real meaning to 6.8 million people, its potential for the future.

For despite its adhesion to Communism there are unique features in today's Cuba. It has the first "Communist" revolution in history that was led by non-Communists. It is the only country adhering to the Soviet bloc that has a true "people's army"—the seven hundred thousand militia. The basic humanism of the Revolution, though more challenged than in December (when I had been there last) remains predominant. Castro and the Cubans, like Tito and Mao, have made their *own* revolution. They are bound to evolve their own forms. Furthermore they are only ninety miles from the United States and are highly dependent on the good will of Latin America. It is this that explains their policy of non-alignment, and their participation in the Belgrade neutralist conference. It is entirely possible—though far from assured—that Cuba may yet evolve its own form of radicalism, quite different from that of either the Soviet or the neutralist world. To close the book on Cuba would be just as much a mistake today as it was in 1960 or 1959.

In 1958 imports from the Soviet Union were nil—but half a billion dollars from the United States. If Cuba needed a spare part for a mill, a phone call was made to Miami and the part was on its way within hours. If a machine broke down, an engineer in Miami could take the next plane to supervise repairs. Now

it takes twenty-two days to get materials from the Soviet bloc; they must be bought in much larger quantities and warehoused. Trade with the United States has been reduced to a trickle—almost nothing (not even an adequate supply of medicines) goes to Cuba—while imports from Russia have skyrocketed to between three and five hundred million dollars a year.

The transition is a painful process, with all kinds of shortages. There is no lard. Meat, beans, rice, eggs, evaporated milk, poultry are scarce. Razor blades, soap flakes, women's sanitary napkins, bottle openers, tooth-paste and scores of other commodities are difficult to purchase. Yet, despite this, the economy is moving ahead rapidly and total consumption has increased, especially in the villages. Castro claims that the nation's wages have gone up by half a billion dollars as a result of wage increases in 1959 and increased employment in subsequent years. The national gross product has gone up from 2.5 to an estimated 3.6 billion dollars this year. Sugar production has risen a million tons since 1957; tobacco about forty per cent; rice has gone up from 225,900 tons in 1958 to 375,000 this year; tomatoes are almost fifty per cent more plentiful, potatoes ten per cent; meat has risen from 169,700 to 207,000 tons.

The humanistic impulses were still prevalent when I visited in August 1961. Thousands of new homes were still being built for the city and village poor. Hundreds of workers' centers were going up everywhere. The beaches and beach clubs, once the exclusive havens of the rich, have been nationalized and are used *gratis* by the poor. Three thousand new schoolrooms have been built in eight months. A hundred thousand city youngsters, twelve to eighteen years old, have been sent to the villages to live with peasants and teach them to read and write. These young people were not, as our Press intimated, torn from their mothers' bosoms, indoctrinated, and sent to the hinterlands by a harsh state. Each student had to have his father's signature to be enrolled, could be sent only to the village chosen by his parents, and could leave the literacy corps any time he pleased. I interviewed many of these youngsters and feel certain of these facts. And while the city young were going to the villages, thousands of village youth were being put up in Havana at the Riviera or Havana Libre hotels, or at posh homes in the Miramar section, to study cooking, sewing and technical trades. Illiteracy will be obliterated by the end of the year, after a massive three-year effort.

Three years ago seven hundred thousand persons were

out of work in Cuba; now there is virtually no joblessness in the villages and perhaps two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand in all. There were eighteen thousand schoolrooms before; now there are thirty-three thousand. A hundred thousand additional new homes are planned for the poor in the coming four-year plan. Industrialization, if carried out as planned, promises to be sensational.

Above all, there is no question that the government is still honest and incorruptible. I met no one, not even among the few counterrevolutionaries with whom I spoke, who feels that Castro is enriching himself or that it is possible to bribe a government official.

The psychological support for the Revolution is nowhere better evidenced than in the militia. Since I was there in December the number has increased from four hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand. No doubt there are a few who have been forced into the ranks by threat of job loss. But I am convinced that the number is small. Most are true volunteers: they work regular shifts and guard the cities and villages on their own time. They receive no pay. They are dedicated people for whom the Revolution has meant a new life.

It is this sense of *belonging* that accounts for Castro's popularity. In August 1961 at least seventy percent of the people supported the régime enthusiastically. This faith is something that no one can describe, unless he has been to Cuba.

There is, of course, no freedom of the press, no freedom of association, no political democracy as we know it. But the picture of unabated terror that we get from our mass media just is not accurate. There are no mass arrests, and, from all credible reports, no torture of prisoners. Even the remaining members of the middle class are not living in the dire fear that we visualize. Any night in the gambling casinos you can find hundreds of shopkeepers and members of the former elite playing fifty or a hundred dollars on a single turn of the roulette wheel. The vast majority of tradesmen are still private entrepreneurs, and there are a hundred and thirty thousand private landowners who till more than half the arable land.

The two flies in Cuba's ointment are the danger of external intervention, and the danger of internal bureaucracy. Cuba's response to the first is to woo both the Communist world and Latin America.

The significant danger, I feel, is internal. The Revolution has been an unparalleled success thus far because it has been consistently humanistic. It has stirred personal initiative as nothing I have seen anywhere else in the world. That feeling is now at its height. But many intellectuals inside Cuba recognize that it cannot continue indefinitely. The span of enthusiasm of a Latin is seldom long, and in Cuba it has already

far exceeded its expectancy. When it begins to flag, the state will have two alternatives: either to offer attractive money incentives and democratic participation in running industry or to use its centralized power to control, perhaps even terrorize, the masses. As the Cuban Revolution enters its third historical phase both the humanistic and the dogmatic tendencies are evident. The armed militia and Castro's own background stand in the way of bureaucratization.

Yet I have a distinct impression that bureaucratic tendencies are growing. I can hardly forget the arrogant attitude of the secret police agent at the airport when I left. I am sure that G-2 is committing many errors. I heard of at least three cases where citizens were imprisoned wrongly and then released—after eight hours, a day, and I don't know how long in the third case. Many, no doubt, are less lucky because there are as yet no civil courts for political prisoners, and the Supreme Court, disbanded last year, has not been replaced.

On the negative side, too, there is a marked increase in adulation for Fidel Castro personally, something that was underplayed last December.

Even more serious, all six newspapers are of one mold, with not a line of dissent in any of them—not even a critical letter. Most of the young writers and journalists would like to change this, but the mood is a dogmatic one. The tendency to dissent—even within the framework of supporting the Revolution—is being whittled away by the Communists.

At the moment none of this has destroyed the humanism of the Revolution, but I went away with the uneasy feeling that the trend was toward more top-down rule, rather than toward lessening controls. The Communists, who have no real mass influence but ride Castro's coattails quite effectively, are a formidable force in the direction of totalitarianism. They have burrowed into the bureaus, in the lower echelons of power, and their influence is moving ahead unchecked.

If there is a curb on the dogmatic spirit it will have to come as a result of three circumstances: the need for cordial relations with Latin America, the fact that Khrushchev prefers a more liberal attitude, so that Cuban influence can weaken the United States hold on Latin America, and the essential humanism of the leaders of the 26th of July movement, especially Castro.

The plans for a new, unified, single party may result in the Communists being engulfed and subordinated. Castro himself will head this party, and perhaps the Communists will no longer be able to function as a tight-knit disciplined group in the broader movement.

The Cuban Revolution is clearly at a turning point. If President Kennedy really wanted to strike a blow at

Communism, one prominent Cuban writer told me, "he could do it in ten minutes by reopening his embassy here. The Communists would fight it and lose ground; Fidel would agree to it immediately and undercut them. After all, we can remain friendly to Russia without a Communist movement internally. Nasser has done it. So have others."

To the extent that the United States continues its

embargo and political offensive, the dangers within Cuba intensify. We have it within our hands, even now, to strengthen the most important humanistic revolution in Latin American history. We can also, by our vulgar and sterile anti-Communism, help the Cuban Communists win the greatest victory possible—to take over a Revolution they opposed, from the hands of the non-Communists who made it.

## LETTERS . . .

Dear Editors:

Sheboygan, Wis.

And, just why were you so "especially pleased" to print "Hell's Kitchen 1959" (October 1961)?

It would seem to us that author Fred Boulmal, in his first published story, has already found "the golden touch" of a *Peyton Place*. Why then should LIBERATION help him, that is, unless liberation means the liberation of sex impulses in the young?

Dr. and Mrs. Carleton Brehmer

*Editors' Note:* It seems to us that the whole man must be liberated—including the sexual man. The need for a more liberated attitude toward sex (freed from fear as well as selfishness in order to grow in sensitivity and love) is indicated by the fact that three persons were troubled that the author revealed a "dirty mind," but no one wrote to complain of his having a "violent" or "vengeful" one. Yet the climax of the story occurs when the frustrated and bewildered protagonist plunges a knife into his rival. To us the story obviously did not advocate sexual license, any more than it advocated revenge and murder, but neither did it reveal a compulsion to exclude sexual curiosity from the formative factors of the boy's adolescence or sexual confusion from the debilitating influences that led to his downfall.

C OLOSSAL

D ECEPTION

### ANALYSIS OF THE SHELTER PROGRAM

By LINUS PAULING

(reprinted from the November issue)

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Although these changes will begin in January, the present subscription price of \$3.00 will stay in effect until March 1st and will apply to all renewals and new subscriptions received before that date. This will give our regular subscribers a chance to renew their own subscriptions and to extend gift subscriptions to their friends under the cheaper rate. In March the newsstand price will advance to 40c and the cost of a year's subscription to \$4.00.

**Liberation** has more than doubled its circulation since August 1960, but still is unknown to thousands of persons who would subscribe if they were familiar with it. Will you help by bringing **Liberation** to the attention of your friends and associates? Our gift offer still holds: four subscriptions for ten dollars (with one of the dollars going to a scholarship fund for a needy Freedom Rider).

# Fear Can Destroy Us . . . But COURAGE IS OUR SHELTER

*On June 15th, 1955, a small band of pacifists, among them Dorothy Day, Ralph Di Gia, Judith Malina, Ammon Hennacy, A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Orlie Pell, were arrested in City Hall Park, New York, for refusing to take shelter under the recently launched program of civil defense in New York State.*

*Thus began a long struggle, which, on May 3rd, 1960, erupted into a mass demonstration of over a thousand persons in City Hall Park. On April 28th of this year, over two thousand persons gathered in the Park, while thousands of students demonstrated on their campuses. The protests spread up and down the East Coast; more than a hundred and sixty persons were arrested on that single day.*

*Today, despite the campaign being carried on by the Federal government to persuade us that there is a defense against nuclear war, thousands of citizens all over the country are beginning to realize that civil defense is a symbol of fear—the fear which, unchecked, can destroy us. The New York Civil Defense Protest Committee has received letters from all over the nation asking for help in setting up local committees.*

*In response to this widespread expression of interest, C.D.P.C. is expanding its work. Not only does it plan to organize the largest demonstration ever held in resistance to civil defense but it has also accepted the responsibility for letting local groups know what current material is available and what action other groups are taking across the country.*



O sinner man,  
where you gonna hide  
all on that day

Ran to the rock, rock won't you hide me,  
Ran to the sun, sun won't you hide me,  
Ran to the sea, sea won't you hide me  
all on that day

As a first step, C.D.P.C. has prepared a special Civil Defense Packet, which is available for a dollar. Write now for the Civil Defense Packet, which comprises the latest literature on the probable effects of nuclear war and the deadly fallacy of the current "civil defense" program.

**CIVIL DEFENSE PROTEST COMMITTEE**  
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